ARE PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATION ONLINE
ENFORCEABLE?
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ABSTRACT
Arbitration is a favored adjudicatory mechanism
because it is efficient, effective, and informal compared to
judicial litigation.2 Scholar Thomas Carbonneau has noted
that arbitration is “America’s optimal trial procedure.”3
The ubiquity of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in
consumer contracts makes arbitration the dominant method
to resolve such disputes.4 Yet, despite its hallmarks of
accessibility and informality, arbitration’s reliance on faceto-face proceedings limits its benefits
Online dispute resolution (ODR) has grown in
popularity among e-commerce retailers over the last two
decades—and more recently within court systems.5
However, ODR’s rise has not meaningfully affected how
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are drafted or enforced.6
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In this article, I prospectively explore the intersection of
mandatory arbitration and ODR by considering whether
agreements to arbitrate online would be enforceable. I
conclude that such agreements would be enforced by U.S.
courts and that ODR’s benefits may make this a favorable
outcome.
It is worth noting at the outset that while my
analysis could be applied broadly, I chose to focus on predispute agreements to arbitrate in the consumer context.
Business-to-business contracts could just as easily include
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online,7 but as courts
are less likely to view those agreements with suspicion,
they warrant little consideration here. Employment
contracts also frequently include agreements to arbitrate,
but parties are less likely to prefer online arbitration in
those cases because parties are more likely in geographical
proximity with one another and their chosen arbitration
venue, minimizing the desire for an online forum.8 Thus, by
focusing on arbitration of consumer disputes, I can test the
validity of pre-dispute agreements in the context they are
most likely to be implemented and challenged.9
In Part I, I begin by surveying the current use of
ODR and arbitration in consumer disputes and studying
why pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online are not yet
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in use. Next, in Part II, I consider the ultimate question of
whether pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online are
enforceable. Finally, in Part III, I explore several
considerations stemming from the conclusion that
agreements to arbitrate online are enforceable.
I.

CURRENT USE OF ODR AND ARBITRATION IN
CONSUMER DISPUTES

Online dispute resolution and arbitration have both
become common—perhaps even fundamental—features of
the U.S. system of justice. In this part, I open by exploring
two parallel upward trends: (1) expanding ODR use to
settle consumer disputes, and (2) growing dependence on
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.
Finally, I conclude by observing that these upward trends
have not yet intersected in the form of a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate online.
A. Expanding Use of ODR in Consumer Disputes
ODR took hold of dispute resolution in e-commerce
two decades ago and is now the hottest trend in court
systems infrastructure.10 Initially developed by e-commerce
platforms such as eBay and Amazon, scholars quickly
embraced ODR, recognizing its potential as a tool for
consumer protection.11 Characteristically late to the party, a
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rapidly growing number of courts are now implementing
ODR systems to mediate and resolve cases.12
The explanation for ODR’s meteoric rise is an oftheard refrain to this century’s technology enthusiasts.
ODR capably resolves e-commerce claims more quickly
and affordably than courts, where filing fees alone may
render a small-dollar claim worthless.13 Moreover, while
face-to-face dispute resolution typically requires
coordinating schedules and travel, ODR lends itself to
asynchronous resolution of disputes without leaving one’s
home.14 Finally, the user-friendly nature of most ODR
platforms makes dispute resolution more accessible to
consumers who might otherwise be overwhelmed by the
formality and cumbersome process that courts demand.15
Companies engaged in e-commerce are often
among the first to adopt new technologies, and ODR is no
exception. In March 1999, eBay launched a mediation
platform to resolve disputes between buyers and sellers
using its website.16 In the years that followed, eBay
automated many of its processes, enabling it to resolve
most disputes without human intervention and faster than
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conventional dispute-resolution processes.17 Amazon and
Etsy, among others, also developed similar, self-contained
ODR platforms.18 More recently, at least 53 courts systems
(and counting) have implemented full-service ODR
platforms designed to facilitate the resolution of disputes
ranging from family law to conciliation court claims.19
It is worth noting that ODR platforms to date have
relied most heavily on mediation-based platforms, rather
than arbitration.20 Early adopters of ODR platforms
recognized that arbitration’s relative simplicity compared to
mediation would minimize the challenges associated with
developing software for online mediation.21 Nevertheless,
concerns about whether consumers would voluntarily opt
17
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into an online arbitration proceeding prompted eBay and
others to develop mediation-based ODR systems rather
than arbitration-based systems.22 At that time, binding,
mandatory ODR was not seriously considered.23 Today, the
likely enforceability of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
online mitigates the question of whether customers would
voluntarily opt into an ODR process.24 Moreover,
consumers’ comfort with e-commerce today likely makes
them less hesitant to engage in online arbitration
proceedings.25 This is especially true after e-commerce’s
supercharged growth as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Without question, ODR represents the future of
dispute resolution and likely many judicial processes.26 In
the consumer context, however, ODR is already the venue
of choice for most consumers, even where participation in
the process is merely voluntary.27 Mandatory ODR is
ODR’s next major hurdle.
B. Near-Ubiquitous Use of Binding Arbitration Clauses
in Consumer Contracts
The near-uniform use of binding arbitration clauses
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in U.S. consumer contracts is well-documented.28 In short,
most written consumer contracts contain pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate that are readily enforced by U.S.
courts under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).29
Furthermore, class-action waivers within arbitration
agreements most often preclude joinder of parties’ claims
in arbitration.30
In February 2019, Professor Imre Stephen Szalai,
writing in the U.C. Davis Law Review Online, surveyed the
expansive use of arbitration clauses by Fortune 100
companies.31 Szalai examined court opinions, pleadings,
and publicly accessible websites to determine whether each
of the top 100 U.S. companies or their subsidiaries
employed consumer arbitration agreements.32 He
discovered that 81 of the Fortune 100 companies or their
subsidiaries used arbitration agreements for consumer
28
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transactions, covering between a majority and two-thirds of
U.S. households.33 In total, Szalai conservatively estimated
that at least 826,537,000 consumer arbitration agreements
were in force in the United States in 2018.34
Consumer arbitration agreements are most
frequently found in relatively low-value transactions and
paired with class-action waivers.35 Disputes arising from
low-value transactions tend to produce “negative-value
suits” in which damaged consumers would incur more in
costs to pursue individual claims than they would gain from
damages awarded in the suit.36 The only practical remedy
for these consumers is a class-action lawsuit.37 By attaching
class-action waivers to consumer arbitration agreements,
sellers foreclose the only remedy available to economically
rational consumers.38 In AT&T Mobility LCC v.
33
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Concepcion,39 the Supreme Court held that inclusion of
class-action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements is
not unconscionable under the FAA’s savings clause.40
Since then, the Court has broadly applied Concepcion’s
holding, enforcing consumer arbitration agreements with
class-action waivers over lower courts’ attempts to limit
and distinguish Concepcion.41
Businesses have taken note of the Court’s classaction-waiver jurisprudence and responded by including
waivers in nearly every consumer contract containing an
arbitration agreement. According to Szalai’s research of
Fortune 100 companies, of the 81 companies employing
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, 78 included class-action
waivers of consumers’ claims.42 Moreover, at least one
court has interpreted an arbitration clause that was silent
regarding class standing as implicitly prohibiting class
actions.43 Of the more than 826 million consumer
39
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arbitration agreements currently in force in the United
States, the vast majority preclude class litigation.44
Having examined the parallel upward trends of
ODR use and consumer arbitration agreements, we next
explore the interaction between the trends.
C. Absence of Mandatory and Binding ODR in
Consumer Contracts
With the near-ubiquity of mandatory arbitration
clauses in consumer disputes and the expanding use of
ODR generally, collision in the form of a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate online seems inevitable. Yet, despite
discussion of this concept during the infancy of the
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and ODR
movements,45 parties have not readily entered these types
of agreements and courts have not passed upon their
enforceability.
Since the late 1990s and early 2000s, scholars have
contemplated the use of binding ODR in consumer
disputes.46 Most notably, in 2004, Aashit Shah discussed
Arbitration About Arbitration, STANFORD L. REV. 363, 395–99 (2018)
(citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010))
(discussing the Court’s reading of a delegation clause as presumptively
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44
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prospective use of ODR for internet-related disputes in the
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology.47 Shah
recognized that the “inherent nature of . . . online disputes
makes them amenable to online ADR.” At the time of
Shah’s writing, however, a major drawback of ODR was
“the inability of parties to enforce their decisions.”48
Shah’s proposed solution typified a pre-dispute agreement
to arbitrate online:
A proposal for e-commerce disputes would
be the insertion of a clause in an online user
agreement whereby the parties, or at least the
online business, agree to be bound by the
decision of the online ADR provider. If the
online business does not cooperate in
enforcing the online decision, the aggrieved
consumer may be able to sue in court for
breach of contract.49
Yet, 16 years after Shah proposed the pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate online, parties still have not entered
such agreements. Surprised by this finding, I scoured
Westlaw for court opinions passing upon the validity of
such an agreement but found no opinions touching on the
(1998) (discussing that while “[t]oday [in 1998], there are no viable
mechanisms for online alternative dispute resolution,” a promise “to
arbitrate online disputes arising out of an online transactions would
‘create a duty . . . to perform the promise’” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981)).
47
Shah, supra note 46, at 13 (identifying specifically that e-commerce
disputes, domain-name disputes, intellectual-property disputes, and
some monetary disputes are especially well-suited for ODR).
48
See id. at 51.
49
See. id. But see id. at 51 n.195 (qualifying that “this option may not
be economically feasible for the aggrieved consumer and it would
entail more costs and attorney’s fees for litigation, which may not be
recouped even if the outcomes were favorable”).

subject.50 Turning next to the arbitration agreements
themselves, I reviewed publicly available agreements to
arbitrate in consumer contracts but found none calling for
online arbitration.51 Thus, while proving a negative is
always an uncertain proposition, it is reasonable to
conclude that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online are
not presently in use and their validity has never been ruled
upon.52
50
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52
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See T. EDWARD DAMER, ATTACKING FAULTY REASONING: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FALLACY-FREE ARGUMENTS 17 (2009). Here,
the absence of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online in the author’s
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At first blush, it seems odd that pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate online have not worked their way
into consumer arbitration agreements. After all, consumers
have flocked to online commerce at a breakneck pace, and
companies have been happy to meet them in that virtual
space.53 Why is it that businesses and their consumers have
not agreed to the binding resolution of disputes in the same
space in which they do business? The following are two
possible explanations.
First, the infrastructure for online arbitration
proceedings is largely non-existent. To be effective, an
arbitration process must be viewed by the parties as
legitimate.54 As Professor Orna Rabinovich-Einy astutely
noted, “Legitimacy is what makes disputants trust a
process, what stimulates complainants to bring their
disputes before a particular dispute resolution mechanism,
and what makes the parties accept and respect resolutions
reached through a given dispute resolution avenue.”55
Today, longstanding organizations such as
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and JAMS
(formerly known as Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services, Inc.) provide the infrastructure for face-to-face
arbitration and the neutrals to serve as arbitrators.56
Disputants’ confidence in these organizations gives them a
53
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55
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Arbitration, 28 No. 6 BUS. TORTS REP. 137, 138 (2016).

badge of legitimacy.57 AAA and JAMS, however, have few
online counterparts to facilitate online arbitration
proceedings, and none of the private online providers of
arbitration that do exist can yet definitively claim the
mantle of legitimacy.58 While companies such as eBay
have long employed ODR solutions for consumer
disputes,59 and courts are quickly implementing online
platforms to mediate and decide cases,60 respected private
providers of online arbitration services have not yet
emerged.61 It may be that agreements to arbitrate online are
not in use simply because there is no readily available
infrastructure to resolve disputes that do arise.62
57

See id.
Online providers certainly exist. See, e.g., ARBITRATION
RESOLUTION SERVICES, INC. (2019), https://www.arbresolutions.com/
(last visited November 28, 2019). However, such providers are not yet
well-known or widely trusted. See Noam Ebner & John Zeleznikow,
36 Fairness, Trust and Security in Online Dispute Resolution, 36
HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. & POL’Y 143, 148 (2015) (noting that the three
critical components for a successful ODR platform are “fairness, trust
and security”).
59
SCHMITZ & RULE, supra note 17, AT 33-46 (describing eBay’s early
implementation of a constantly evolving ODR platform to resolve
disputes between buyers and sellers using eBay’s platform).
60
For a regularly updated list of courts now using ODR, see Courts
Using ODR, NAT’L CENTER FOR TECH. & DISP. RESOL.,
odr.info/courts-using-odr/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2019). See also David
Allen Larson, Designing and Implementing a State Court ODR System:
From Disappointment to Celebration, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 77 (2019)
(explaining the years-long project to design and implement an ODR
platform for the New York State Unified Court System).
61
See supra note 58 and accompanying text. Only one litigated matter
available on Westlaw has considered a dispute in which an award was
made by Arbitration Resolution Service, Inc. See Ronald J. Palagi,
P.C., LLC v. Prospect Funding Holdings (NY), LLC, 925 N.W.2d 344,
347–49 (Neb. 2019). But even there, arbitration by an online provider
was not agreed to before the dispute arose.
62
It bears noting that the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) established a type of ODR that resembled online
arbitration proceedings. Developed to resolve disputes between
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However, a second explanation is perhaps more
compelling. It may be that pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online would unnecessarily jeopardize the classaction waivers paired with most arbitration agreements.63
Under the Supreme Court precedent discussed above,
drafters of arbitration agreements can be reasonably certain
the inclusion of a class-action waiver will not be ruled
unenforceable for unconscionability.64 Furthermore, for
most businesses, class-action waivers are more valuable
than agreements to arbitrate standing alone; the agreement
to arbitrate operates as a risk-free vehicle to obtain an
enforceable class-action waiver.65 Thus, savvy drafters may
be unwilling to risk a court concluding an agreement to
arbitrate online is unconscionable when doing so might also
invalidate the class-action waiver.66

registrants for domain names based on others’ trademarks, ICANN’s
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy featured a compulsory online
process whereby a complainant seeking to use or cancel another’s
domain name registration could file a complaint with one of five online
dispute-resolution providers for non-binding resolution. ICANN’s
form of dispute resolution, while a pre-dispute agreement to use ODR,
is distinguishable from the pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate online
that is the subject of this essay because ICANN’s dispute-resolution
process relied solely on written submissions and was non-binding. For
a summary of ICANN’s ODR process, see Rabinovich-Einy, supra
note 54, at 50–55.
63
Supra Part I(B) (discussing the near-ubiquitous nature of arbitration
clauses paired with class-action waivers).
64
See id.
65
See generally Jacqueline Prats, Are Arbitration Agreements
Necessary for Class-Action Waivers to Be Enforceable?, 92 FLA. BAR
J. 64 (2018) (noting that while companies have a need for class-action
waivers, arbitration agreements may be less desirable, and arguing for
the enforceability of stand-alone class-action waivers).
66
See id.

Assuming the latter explanation, I next reach the
titular question of this article by evaluating whether predispute agreements to arbitrate online are enforceable
II.

ENFORCEMENT OF PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS TO
ARBITRATE ONLINE

I have already noted that the enforceability of predispute agreements to arbitrate online is an untested
question.67 Indeed, I found no case touching upon this
question, nor any evidence that such agreements are now in
use.68 In this section, I explain why courts would enforce
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online and the limits
courts would likely place on such agreements.
A. Principles of Contract Freedom Support
Enforcement
Otherwise known as party autonomy, freedom of
contract is the primary legal concept governing arbitration
in the United States.69 It enables parties to bind themselves
to a form of dispute resolution and agree upon the rules that
will govern any disputes that arise between them.70 Courts,
meanwhile, are simply “to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance
with their terms.”71 Relying on freedom of contract, courts
67

Supra Part I(C).
Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
69
CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that freedom of contract
governs arbitration in “the vast majority of countries”).
70
See id. (“Freedom of contract allows arbitrating parties to write their
own rules of arbitration—in effect, it permits them to establish the law
of arbitration for their transaction.”). Carbonneau also notes that this
party-directed approach depends on the parties identifying their
adjudicatory needs before a dispute arises, thereby “front load[ing]” the
parties’ dealings. Id. at 11.
71
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
68

generally enforce agreements to arbitrate in whatever form
they take, provided the parties have agreed to those terms.72
But can the principle of contract freedom carry the day for
a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate a consumer dispute
online? Jurisprudence supporting the enforceability of
forum-selection provisions suggests it can.73
Before analyzing agreements to arbitrate online
through the lens of forum-selection jurisprudence, there
must be a justification for doing so. In 1974, the Supreme
Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.74 articulated, “An
agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in
effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that
posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be
used in resolving the dispute.”75 In Scherk, the Court
enforced an international arbitration agreement, concluding
that such an agreement was merely a type of forumselection clause, akin to those the Court had upheld
previously.76 While contemporary Supreme Court decisions
regarding arbitration agreements have focused more on

§ 5 (2018) (recognizing the principle of contract freedom in the FAA
by specifying that agreements providing “for the method of naming or
appointing an arbitrator” must be enforced).
72
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (“Arbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of
consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their
arbitration agreements as they see fit ....... ”).
73
For a survey of the jurisprudence enforcing forum-selection
provisions in consumer arbitration contracts, see CARBONNEAU, supra
note 2, at 387.
74
417 U.S. 506 (1974).
75
Id. at 519.
76
See id. at 518–19 (citing Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S.
1, 15 (1972)) (“Rather, we concluded that a ‘forum clause should
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.’”).

statutory analysis under the FAA,77 Scherk’s theoretical
analysis of arbitration agreements as a subset of forumselection clauses remains compelling.78
The Supreme Court has held that only “under
extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience
of the parties” will a forum-selection clause go
unenforced.79 Relying on the Court’s forum-selectionclause analysis, courts have readily enforced agreements to
arbitrate at a particular location, absent evidence of
unconscionability.80 For example, in Elf Atochem North
America, Inc. v. Jaffari,81 the Delaware Supreme Court
enforced an agreement that arbitration would take place in
California, even though the underlying suit could have been
brought in Delaware absent the arbitration agreement.82
Similarly, in Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc.,83 the
Ninth Circuit strictly enforced a contract containing an
agreement to arbitrate all claims at the defendant’s
77

See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011);
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Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
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The Court has repeated Scherk’s conclusion that agreements to
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S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 698, 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1783, 176 L. Ed. 2d 605 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534
(1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
482–83 (1989); Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22,
36 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 255 n.1 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571
U.S. 49, 62 (2013) (reversing and remanding the lower court’s refusal
to dismiss or transfer the case pursuant to a forum-selection clause); see
also Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (holding that
a forum-selection clause on cruise tickets was not prohibited).
80
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 387.
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727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999).
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See id. at 287.
83
623 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2010).

principal place of business.84
In its Polimaster decision, the Ninth Circuit
demonstrated the strength of contract freedom principles as
applied to arbitration. There, Polimaster (a company based
in Belarus) and RAE (based in California) agreed to the
following arbitration provision: “In case of failure to settle
the mentioned disputes by means of negotiations they
should be settled by means of arbitration at the defendant’s
[site].”85 After Polimaster submitted a demand for
arbitration to take place at RAE’s headquarters, it objected
to RAE’s subsequent counterclaims, arguing that because
Polimaster was the defendant for the counterclaims, RAE
could only pursue those claims through arbitration at
Polimaster’s location.86 Interpreting the term “dispute” in
the contract to encompass both claims and counterclaims,
the court concluded the counterclaims could only be
arbitrated at Polimaster’s headquarters in Belarus because
Polimaster was the defendant for those claims.87
Although efficiency concerns typically justify
resolving claims and counterclaims in the same proceeding,
84

See id. at 837 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
519 (1974) (“The requirement of arbitration at the defendant’s site is
effectively a forum-selection clause, in which the parties agreed to
arbitrate at the location of the defendant’s principal place of
business.”).
85
See id. at 834. While the text of the contract literally prescribed that
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See id. at 835.
87
See id. at 837. Although the Ninth Circuit evaluated the arbitration
agreement under the New York Convention, it noted that the grounds
for confirming an award under the Convention “generally track” those
under the FAA. See id. at 836 (citing Mgmt. & Technical Consultants
S.A. v. Parsons-Jurden Int’l Corp., 820 F.2d 1531, 1534 (9th Cir.
1987)).

the Ninth Circuit openly admitted it “interpreted the
parties’ arbitration clause so as to permit an inefficient
result: parallel arbitrations in distant fora regarding similar
and/or related topics and disputes.”88 Yet, the court insisted
that principles of contract freedom demanded this result.89
“It is true that it may be inefficient to have multiple
arbitrations regarding the parties’ dealings in different fora
before different arbitrators. But we cannot override the
express terms of the parties’ agreement, because parties are
free to agree to inefficient arbitration procedures.”90
Indeed, the court concluded, freedom of contract principles
demanded “adherence to the parties’ agreed-upon
procedures.”91
Polimaster’s contract freedom principles readily
permit the conclusion that an agreement to arbitrate online
would also be enforceable. After all, if courts will enforce
such an inefficient agreement that requires the parties to
arbitrate the same matter in multiple proceedings an ocean
apart, it stands to reason they would also readily enforce an
agreement to arbitrate online, an undeniably efficient
venue. Admittedly, Polimaster considered two
sophisticated parties engaged in international commerce,
but case law supports application of its contract freedom
88

Id. at 840.
See id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)) (“First, the policy favoring
arbitration ‘is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of
private contractual arrangements.’”).
90
Id. (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217–21
(1985) (requiring arbitration where it resulted in inefficient procedures
and demanding that courts “rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate”).
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Id. at 841; see also In re Hops Antitrust Litigation, 655 F. Supp. 169
(E.D. Mo. 1987) (enforcing an arbitration clause with a German forumselection clause in a contract between German hops sellers and a U.S.
hops purchaser).
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principles in the consumer context as well.
For example, in Jones v. Genus Credit Management
Corp.,92 decided by the federal court for the District of
Maryland, the plaintiffs were consumers who enrolled in a
debt-management plan with a credit management
company.93 The agreed-to debt-management plan
incorporated by reference an arbitration clause requiring
that arbitration proceedings take place in Columbia,
Maryland.94 The court evaluated the agreement to arbitrate
in a particular forum to determine whether it was
unconscionable.95 Initially, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs that there was procedural unconscionability
because the plaintiffs were heavily indebted individuals
who had no choice but to agree to the arbitration agreement
presented to them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.96 However,
the court refused to find substantive unconscionability in
the adhesion contract on the basis that it required that
indebted plaintiffs travel to Maryland to arbitrate any
disputes with the company.97 Relying on the Supreme
92

353 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D. Md. 2005).
See id. at 600.
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Agreements” signed by the plaintiffs, but rather in a document titled
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95
See id. at 601–02. The court analyzed the agreement to arbitrate by
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WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:10 (4th ed. 2004)).
96
See id. at 601 (finding procedural unconscionability because
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Seed. at 601–02 (rejecting the plaintiffs’ arguments for substantive
unconscionability based on the agreements requirement that arbitration
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Maryland).
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Court’s enforcement of a forum-selection clause in
Carnival Cruise Lines, the court noted that “the mere fact
that the arbitration clause requires that the arbitration
proceedings be held at a location distant from plaintiffs’
residences is not a sufficient basis for invalidating them.”98
Without a showing of substantive unconscionability, the
court enforced the consumers’ agreement to arbitrate in a
particular place.99
Application of Jones to agreements to arbitrate
online strongly suggests a court would enforce such
agreements, even in the consumer context. Like forumselection clauses, agreements to arbitrate online direct
consumers where to go to present their claims to a neutral
decision maker.100 The difference, however, is that the
place to go is online. If a court is willing to compel
consumers to arbitrate in distant geographic locations, as it
was in Jones, it likely would also be willing to compel
consumers to arbitrate when the chosen venue can be
accessed via a smartphone or computer.
Countless other cases could be discussed here to
support extending the application of contract freedom
principles to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate consumer
disputes online. Recognizing, however, that all legal
conclusions have limits, I turn next to circumstances where
courts may refuse to enforce pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online.
B. Limits on Enforceability
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Id. at 602 (citing Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
593–94 (1991)).
99
See id.
100
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (noting
that agreements to arbitrate are a type of forum-selection clause).

In this section, I consider closely the three theories
most likely to be asserted by consumers seeking to avoid
mandatory online arbitration. They include (1)
unconscionability, (2) the requirement for a bona fide
adjudicatory process, and (3) the prospect of states
prohibiting compelled online arbitration by statute. Each
theory is considered in turn.
C. Unconscionability
Contract freedom principles do not lend legitimacy
to unconscionable agreements—especially in the consumer
context.101 Courts have, at times, refused to enforce forumselection clauses as unconscionable where they were not
effectively communicated or where they were clearly used
to discourage customers from pursuing legitimate claims.102
Applied to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online,
courts may invalidate agreements when presented with
evidence of procedural and substantive
unconscionability.103 Procedural unconscionability could be
based on severe power imbalances between the parties
paired with insufficient notice in a click-wrap style
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In addition to unconscionability, several other theories may void a
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (stating the
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agreement.104 Substantive unconscionability could arise if
the drafter of the agreement to arbitrate online narrowed the
choice of online arbitration providers to those favorable to
it or where the selected provider’s online arbitration
platform is unusable without special expertise.105 Yet, predispute agreements to arbitrate online are not likely to be
often struck down for unconscionability.106 Cases finding
unconscionability in forum-selection provisions of
arbitration clauses are outliers that typically involve
surprise or deceit and substantially impair the plaintiff’s
ability to pursue a claim.107 Moreover, a properly
communicated agreement to arbitrate online is unlikely to
raise questions regarding conscionability, as an online
dispute-resolution platform likely enhances, rather than
restricts, a plaintiff’s ability to pursue a claim.108
D. Requirement of a Bona Fide Adjudicatory Process
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108
Supra Part II(A).

Arbitration agreements are not enforceable when
the weaker party is forced into an adjudicatory process that
lacks fundamental characteristics to make it a suitable
alternative to judicial justice.109 Arguments under this
theory take one of two forms: either (1) the arbitration
agreement fails because it calls for a process that
unconscionably favors the drafting party, or (2) the
agreement fails as a breach of contract based on the
drafting party’s failure to provide for a true arbitral process.
Plaintiffs seeking to avoid enforcement of an agreement to
arbitrate online might rely on either of these arguments to
invalidate the agreement for lack of a bona fide
adjudicatory process.
In the Ryan’s Family Steak Houses cases,110
employees agreed to an arbitration agreement as a
condition of employment that essentially called for “sham
proceedings” that unconscionably favored the drafting
party.111 The arbitration agreements in these employment
cases failed on two fronts. First, the agreement committed
the employee to an arbitration process provided by the
employer but merely committed the employer to provide an
arbitration forum, rules, procedures, and a hearing, without
articulating any standards the selected process must
satisfy.112 The contract’s failure to articulate standards was
a failure on the face of the contract to provide a bona fide
109
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adjudicatory process.113 Second, the process that the
employer provided was not, in fact, neutral, so the contract
failed to provide a bona fide adjudicatory process as
applied.114 To avoid the outcome in the Ryan’s Family
Steak Houses cases, prudent drafters of agreements to
arbitrate online must provide a bona fide, neutral process to
consumers and should include in the agreement detailed
descriptions of the process provided.
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips115 demonstrates
the second basis to invalidate an arbitration agreement for
lack of a bona fide adjudicatory process—breach of
contract.116 There, the Fourth Circuit held that Hooters
created a dispute resolution that was so biased in its favor
that it was “a sham system unworthy even of the name of
arbitration.”117 Severely biased aspects of the process
included a mechanism for selecting arbitrators that ensured
a biased decision maker;118 limiting the scope of the
arbitration for the employee, but not the employer;119 and
permitting Hooters to cancel the arbitration agreement on
30 days’ notice, but binding the employee to the arbitration
agreement indefinitely.120 Concluding that the process
Hooters provided could not fairly be considered arbitration,
113
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the court held it had “completely failed in performing its
contractual duty” to provide an arbitral process for
resolving disputes with its employees, and rescinded the
agreement to arbitrate.121
Applying Hooters to agreements to arbitrate online
simply requires that the online process provided be truly
neutral and that the decision makers provided are
unbiased.122 Very likely, it also means—at least for now—
that the neutral decision maker must be a person rather than
an automated process. The requirement for a bona fide
adjudicatory process is not a major hurdle to the
enforceability of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online.
But, to avoid such a challenge, drafters should articulate in
clear terms the specific, neutral, arbitral process that will be
provided.
E. States’ Authority to Limit Enforceability Via Statute
The final limit that may be placed on the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate online stems from
an uncertain portion of preemption law under the FAA.
Although the FAA broadly preempts state laws that would
treat arbitration clauses differently than other contract
terms, states might retain authority to regulate aspects of
arbitration proceedings once commenced.123 State
legislatures might enact legislation prohibiting online

Id. at 940 (“[Hooters’] performance under the contract was so
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Arbitration Act Preemption, 67 FLA. L. REV. 711, 759–63 (2015). For a
summary of the federalism principles underlying the Supreme Court’s
FAA jurisprudence, see CARBONNEAU, supra note 2, at 281–314.
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arbitration proceedings based on concerns about the
fairness of online proceedings.124
Several states currently regulate aspects of
arbitration proceedings without limiting the enforceability
of agreements to arbitrate. For example, a Kentucky law
grants parties to arbitration the unwaivable right to be
represented by an attorney in arbitration.125 In another
example, a Florida statute allows a court to consolidate
separate arbitration proceedings into one proceeding
notwithstanding a class-action waiver.126 Finally, a
Montana statute limits the enforceability of arbitral forumselection clauses that call for an arbitral forum outside
Montana.127 As Kristen Blankley noted, these statutes may
be suspect under the Supreme Court’s current FAA
preemption jurisprudence,128 but for now they are
presumably valid.
For our purposes, Montana’s limitation on forumselection clauses in arbitration agreements is especially
noteworthy.129 If a state may limit where arbitration may
take place, it follows that a state may prohibit online
124
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arbitration proceedings.130 Indeed, Montana’s statute as
written could be construed as prohibiting online arbitration
where one party or the arbitrator accesses an online
arbitration platform from outside Montana.131 Once again,
whether statutes like Montana’s are preempted under the
FAA is uncertain, but if they are not, states could prohibit
online arbitration proceedings without running afoul of the
FAA.
The three limitations presented in this section
present surmountable hurdles to the enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate disputes online.
Unconscionability and the requirement for a bona fide
adjudicatory process are unlikely to limit enforcement
except in cases where bad faith is evident. Similarly, states
are likely to enact statutes prohibiting online arbitration
proceedings—assuming states have that power—only if
online arbitration limits, rather than expands, consumer
access to effective dispute resolution. Having concluded
that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online are
enforceable in the consumer context, I contemplate the
implications in this article’s final part.
III.
IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF PRE-DISPUTE AGREEMENTS
TO ARBITRATE ONLINE
It is challenging to predict the consequences of a
new legal principle—and daunting to predict the trajectory
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of technology.132 Nevertheless, in this section, I discuss a
few of the ways pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online
may impact consumers and businesses. My observations in
this part consist of solely of policy analysis. Recognizing
some readers may disagree with my thoughts on this
matter, I encourage them to pen their disagreements for our
benefit.
A. Consumer Protection and the FAIR Act
For as long as arbitration clauses have been in use,
consumer protection advocates have decried their use in
consumer contexts, especially when paired with classaction waivers.133 The Supreme Court has regularly
chastised circuit courts and state supreme courts for
attempting to circumvent the Court’s broad reading of the
FAA’s policy favoring arbitration.134 For others, mandatory
arbitration facilitates swift and effective relief that could
not be easily obtained via a judicial process.135
Pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate online would
likely fail to mitigate consumer-protection advocates’
132
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concerns that businesses use arbitration agreements to
preclude legitimate consumer claims. But perhaps the
prospect of such agreements should ease fears to some
extent. At worst, transitioning pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate from face-to-face to online forums simply moves
online a resolution process that gives consumers at least as
fair a process as they presently enjoy. At best, online
arbitration proceedings will expand access to justice for
consumers with limited means or mobility and for those in
need of accommodations such as language services.
Indeed, in their book “The New Handshake: Online
Dispute Resolution and the Future of Consumer
Protection,” Professor Amy Schmitz and Colin Rule136
discussed at length ODR’s potential to level the playing
field for consumers.137 They contemplated a third-party
service, affectionately called Newhandshake.org, that
businesses could employ for dispute resolution.138 A
business using the service would place a link to
Newhandshake.org on its website where consumers can
easily access the service.139 If the consumer became
unhappy with the company’s service, the consumer could
submit a complaint via the link.140 Newhandshake.org
would then resolve the dispute online, giving the consumer
and business a quick and satisfactory resolution.141
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Admittedly, Schmitz and Rule contemplated a nonbinding resolution mechanism,142 but many of their
arguments apply with nearly as much force to the prospect
of online arbitration proceedings. Even in a mandatory
setting, ODR stands to expand consumers’ access to
dispute-resolution services.143 After all, consumers are
more likely to seek the relief to which they are entitled
when initiating the process requires only a few taps on their
phone screen and when the claim can be pursued without
taking time off work or traveling.144 While arguing, “It’s
better than what we have now,” is not particularly
satisfying, marginal improvement is nonetheless a worthy
cause.145 After all, there are many consumers to be helped
in the margins.
The prospect of online arbitration also has
implications for legislation recently under consideration. In
2019, the House of Representatives passed the Forced
Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act.146 If adopted, the
act would prohibit the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and class-action waivers in employment,
See id. at 87 (arguing that “ODR systems should not block access to
the courts for consumers” even though the percentage of complainant
consumers that will want to pursue a claim in court is likely to be 0.001
percent).
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See id. at 97–98 (explaining how a consumer could initiate a
complaint via a simple online form).
145
Michael B. Metzger, Bridging the Gaps: Cognitive Constraints on
Corporate Control & Ethics Education, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
435, 554 (2005) (“But marginal improvement is probably attainable in
many cases and, given the stakes, well worth pursuing.”).
146
Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong.
(2019).
142

consumer, antitrust, and civil rights matters.147 Proponents
supporting the bill pointed to the consumer-protection
concerns outlined above, arguing that pre-dispute
arbitration agreements and class-action waivers rob
consumers (and other vulnerable parties) of their right to
legitimate relief.148 The bill was dead on arrival in the
Senate, where members opposed the bill’s curtailment of
contract freedom and free-market principles and expressed
concerns that passage would flood the courts with claims
now resolved privately.149
A complete policy analysis of the FAIR Act is
beyond the scope of this article, but the subject of this
article may alleviate to some extent the concerns that
prompted its introduction. Proponents of the FAIR Act fear
that the process provided to consumers and others in
arbitration is an insufficient substitute for judicial
process.150 While the prospect of consumers being bound to
an out-of-court dispute-resolution forum via an adhesion
contract troubles proponents of the FAIR Act, perhaps that
concern can be ameliorated if the forum agreed to is
demonstrably fair and effective.
Three considerations suggest online arbitration may
assuage some of the concerns. First, online arbitration will
147
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expand consumers’ access to dispute resolution by enabling
them to pursue claims entirely online, without traveling to
an arbitration proceeding, sometimes in distant
jurisdictions.151 Second, online arbitration proceedings will
be more affordable than face-to-face proceedings because
there are no travel expenses and fewer formalities, making
a low-value claim more likely to be worth pursuing.152
Finally, consumers engaged in e-commerce will be more
likely to pursue their claims when they can interact with the
arbitral process entirely online, absent the intimidating
process of face-to-face adjudication.153 Whether these
marginal improvements should placate consumer protection
concerns underlying the FAIR Act is a question for your
own consideration, but I submit that these factors should
weigh on your analysis of the FAIR Act.
In the final section, I move from the consumer
perspective to that of businesses and providers of
arbitration services to explore several considerations
regarding the drafting of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
online and the arbitral process provided.
B. Considerations for Businesses and Service Providers
Businesses and service providers must consider
several factors before deciding to transition from face-toface to online arbitration. These considerations fall into two
categories: contract drafting and arbitral process. The
contract-drafting considerations involve how a pre-dispute
agreement to arbitrate online should be drafted to avoid
151
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surprises. The arbitral process considerations involve due
process concerns and best practices that should be applied
in online arbitration proceedings.
C. Contract Drafting
The contract drafting precautions regarding predispute agreements to arbitrate online are, in large part, the
same as those for pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
generally.154 For example, the consumer must have a
reasonable opportunity to review the arbitration agreement
before agreeing to it,155 and the agreement must state with
sufficient clarity the process the consumer must follow to
bring a claim.156 Three additional issues should be
considered.
First, just as international law is often less friendly
than U.S. law to pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
consumer disputes, international law will also likely be less
friendly to mandatory and binding ODR.157 In 2010, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) established a working group to develop
standards for ODR.158 The working group devoted a great
154
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deal of attention to whether ODR outcomes should be
binding.159 Jurisdictions that permit pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, such as the United States, were at odds with
those, such as the European Union, that render pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate non-binding pursuant to consumer
protection laws.160 While the UNCITRAL working group
reached a compromise that would enforce pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate in many settings, some foreign
jurisdictions may view pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
online with hostility and refuse to enforce them.161 Despite
the likely enforceability of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online in the United States, drafters should
anticipate that enforcement will be less likely in
international courts.
Second, drafters of pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online should explicitly state the parties’ choice of
law. When a contract containing an arbitration agreement is
silent as to choice of law, arbitrators, in their discretion,
often apply the law of the forum in which the arbitration
takes place.162 As applied to pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online, choice of law is less certain because
arbitrators must rely on factors other than geography to
decide what law to apply. Thus, drafters should include
clear choice-of-law provisions in pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online to avoid uncertainty later.
Finally, not every dispute will be appropriate for
online resolution. For example, disputes that require close
159
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inspection of physical evidence cannot be easily decided
via an online process. Thus, pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate online should limit the types of disputes that will
be decided in online proceedings, reserving all other claims
for face-to-face arbitration or judicial proceedings.
D. Arbitral Process Concerns
While online arbitration presents unique
opportunities for improvements in fairness and efficiency
of the arbitral process, it also presents due process concerns
that online arbitration providers must consider. As
Professor Schmitz noted, “Efficiency should not
overshadow fairness. It is therefore essential to build ODR
systems for particular contexts in consideration of due
process standards.”163
The International Council for Online Dispute
Resolution (ICODR) articulated a set of nine standards that
represent a starting point for online arbitration providers.164
The ICODR’s list of standards requires that ODR systems
be accessible, accountable, competent, confidential, equal,
fair/impartial/neutral, legal, secure, and transparent.165
These principles represent baseline standards for online
arbitration proceedings.
Development of online arbitration also presents
opportunities for improving arbitral processes beyond the
due-process baseline. Providers should explore these
opportunities. For example, online arbitration platforms can
employ structural mechanisms to defeat biases, such as
limiting the arbitrator’s access to irrelevant information that
163
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could bias the result.166 Online arbitration can also expand
access to dispute resolution by incorporating language
services and other accessibility features.167 Opportunities
such as these have the potential to make online arbitration a
preferred form of dispute resolution for businesses and
consumers.
The considerations presented in this section are
merely those that are readily apparent. Additional
considerations will certainly come into focus as online
arbitration comes into use and precedents regarding its use
evolve.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The titular question of this article asks whether predispute agreements to arbitrate online are enforceable,
particularly in the consumer context. Although this
question has not been explored at all by courts—and only
in passing by scholars—application of the Supreme Court’s
forum-selection-clause jurisprudence readily demonstrates
that such agreements are enforceable. Moreover, this may
be a good result, as enforcement of pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate online may expand businesses’ and consumers’
See generally Sela, supra note 10 (proposing “an initial set of
recommendations to reduce bias [in ODR systems] and encourage
informed and deliberate decision-making”). Sela’s article proposes that
the digital-choice architecture could be tailored to limit the influence of
bias in online courts, but her recommendations have just as much merit
in the context of online arbitration. See id. at 130 (“Digital choice
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access to efficient and effective resolution of e-commerce
disputes.

